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Abstract We introduce Personalised Rating, a network-based rating system
where individuals, connected in a social network, decide whether or not to
consume a service (e.g., a restaurant) based on the evaluations provided by
their peers. We compare Personalised Rating with the more widely used Ob-
jective Rating where, instead, customers receive an aggregate evaluation of
what everybody else has declared so far. We focus on the manipulability of
such systems, allowing a malicious service provider (e.g., the restaurant owner)
to transfer monetary incentive to the individuals in order to manipulate their
rating and increase the overall profit. We study manipulation under various
constraints, such as the proportion of individuals who evaluate the service
and, in particular, how much the attacker knows of the underlying customers’
network, showing the conditions under which the system is bribery-proof, i.e.,
no manipulation strategy yields a strictly positive expected gain to the service
provider. We also look at manipulation strategies that are feasible in theory
but might, in general, be infeasible in practice, deriving a number of algorith-
mic properties of manipulation under Personalised Rating. In particular we
show that establishing the existence of a rewarding manipulation strategy for
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the attacker—and, notably, an optimal one—is NP-complete, even with full
knowledge of the underlying network structure.
1 Introduction
We use online reviews all the time: for food, movies and even doctors. But
can we trust them? Online rating systems such as TripAdvisor, Amazon or
Netflix, where a small proportion of users writes reviews which are read by
a potentially large number of others, are clearly manipulable: each service
provider is able to offer a compensation—monetary or otherwise—in exchange
for a positive review, having an impact on the whole set of potential customers.
These systems are based on what we call Objective Rating, or O-rating:
individual evaluations are aggregated into a single figure, which is seen by,
and thus influences, every potential user.
The New York Times (Streitfeld, 2016) has recently argued how the most
commonly used rating systems come with “persistent controversies over how
many of the reviews on the internet were bought by the subject rather than
written as finely reasoned opinions from a neutral party, and whether that dis-
torts all results”. In particular, relating to what is demonstrated by de Lange
et al. (2016), their emphasis on “the average user rating as a cue for objective
quality appears to be based on an illusion of validity” and shows “a sub-
stantial disconnect between the objective quality of information that online
user ratings actually convey and the extent to which consumers trust them
as indicators of objective quality” (de Lange et al., 2016). As the number of
decisions taken based on rating systems grows by the day, it is fair to say that
the problem of deterring their manipulation is one of the big challenges faced
by companies and governments today.
Distributed Artificial Intelligence has seen a sharp rise in the study of
recommendation systems, i.e., platforms that construct (often learning-based)
protocols to match users and provide accurate suggestions, as an effort to im-
prove the trustworthiness of online rating (for a survey see, e.g., Bobadilla
et al., 2013). Users’ evaluations can be carefully screened, and obvious biases
(e.g., ethinicity-based discrimination) can be detected, but the AI of recom-
mendation systems still needs to be combined with an analysis of the incen-
tives needed to avert manipulation. In particular, as also noted by Tennenholtz
(2008) and Alon et al. (2015), we need to establish the theoretical guarantees
that are required for such systems to be resistant to manipulation. Recently,
researchers in algorithmic mechanism design have begun to focus their atten-
tion on recommendation systems (see, e.g., the emerging subject of economic
recommendation systems, Bahar et al., 2016) as an effort to close this gap and
to start studying rating formation from a strategic point of view. Our paper
should be seen as part of this effort.
What we study here is a rating system in which each individual sees only
the evaluation given by the set of trusted peers, his or her friends, and only
this aggregated opinion influences his or her decision. This is what we call
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Personalised Rating, or P-rating, which can be seen as a generalisation of
O-rating in which influence has a complex network structure. In particular,
while in the case of O-rating, the restaurant owner knows exactly how influ-
ence flows among the customers, this might not be the case with P-rating. It
is therefore important to assess the capacity of the external attacker to modify
the network as a function of what he or she knows about its structure, which
is the point of view we take in this paper.
Our contribution We analyse the effect of bribing strategies in the case of
O-rating and P-rating under various constraints depending on the pres-
ence of customers who do not express any opinion and the knowledge of the
network that the service provider has. In particular we investigate the cases of
whether the exact network is known to the attacker, the network is known but
not the customers’ exact positions, and the network is completely unknown.
We show under which conditions the system is bribery-proof, i.e., there is no
bribe yielding a strictly positive gain for the service provider, and we provide
algorithms for computing (all) optimal bribing strategies when they do exist.
Intuitively, being able to know and bribe influential customers is crucial for
guaranteeing that a bribing strategy yields a positive reward. However, while
with large populations of non-voters random bribes can still be profitable, the
effect of P-rating is largely different from that of O-rating and, as we show,
the expected profit with the former can be severely limited and drops below
zero in all networks, under certain (mild) conditions on the cost of bribes.
We also study manipulation from an algorithmic point of view. In do-
ing so, we follow the standard approach of computational voting theory (for
a survey see, e.g., Conitzer and Walsh, 2016), which has shown that even
if strategy-proof voting rules cannot be designed, as a consequence of the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), some
voting rules exist that are safe from manipulation in practice, as computing
manipulation strategies is NP-hard. We show that even if a personalised rat-
ing system is manipulable in theory, the problem of manipulation, in general,
might be infeasible in practice. In particular, we establish that even when the
attacker has full knowledge of the network the problem of determining the
existence of a manipulation strategy that guarantees a given reward—and, in
particular, an optimal one—is NP-complete. We do so by giving a polynomial-
time reduction from the problem of finding an independent set of a given size
k in a 3-regular graph.
Related research lines Our approach relates to several research lines in the
field of multi-agent systems:
Network-based voting and mechanism design We study social networks in which
individuals’ local decisions can be manipulated to modify the resulting
global properties. A similar approach is taken by Apt and Markakis (2014)
and Simon and Apt (2015), which study the changes on a social network
needed to make users adopt a certain product. Further contributions in-
clude rational secret sharing and multi-party computation (Abraham et al.,
2006), the strategic manipulation of peer reviews (Kurokawa et al., 2015),
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and the growing literature on voting in social networks (see, e.g., the sur-
vey by Grandi (2017)). A highly relevant line of research is the work of Lev
and Tennenholtz (2017) , which studies theoretical guarantees for group
recommendations, as well as papers that have looked at social network-
based recommendations, such as the work of Andersen et al. (2008).
Lobbying and Bribery Our framework features an external agent trying to in-
fluence individual decisions to reach his or her private objectives. Lobbying
in decision-making is an important problem in the area of social choice
which is evident from the seminal contribution of Helpman and Persson
(1998) to more recent studies in multi-issue voting (Christian et al., 2007;
Grandi et al., 2019). Lobbying and bribery are also established concepts
in computational social choice, with their computational complexity being
analysed extensively in multiple recent papers (Faliszewski et al., 2009;
Baumeister et al., 2011; Bredereck et al., 2014, 2016). Although our focus
is manipulation by incentives, there are a number of relevant approaches
that have close connections to our work, notably the work of Conitzer et al.
(2010), Waggoner et al. (2012), Todo and Conitzer (2013) and Brill et al.
(2016), which study the effect of adding fake profiles to a social network, a
closely related problem to bribery. The importance of this line of research
is to demonstrate the role of the graph structure in resisting manipulation,
with applications to opinion spreading Alon et al. (2015) and community
detection Todo and Conitzer (2013).
Reputation-based systems We study the aggregation of possibly insincere indi-
vidual evaluations by agents that can influence one another through trust
relations. In this sense our framework can be seen as a study of repu-
tation in Multi Agent Systems, which has been an important concern of
MAS in past decades (Conte and Paolucci, 2002; Sabater and Sierra, 2005;
Garcin et al., 2009). In particular, our framework treats reputation as a
manipulable piece of information, not just a static aggregation of individ-
ual opinions, much as is the case in the work of Conte et al. (2008) and
Pinyol and Sabater-Mir (2013).
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce Ever since the seminal contributions by
Sierra (2004), Feigenbaum et al. (2009), and Dash et al. (2003), the concept
of agent-mediated market has taken a central role in distributed AI. It
goes without saying that the increased level of automation in these markets
requires increasingly robust mechanisms to avoid manipulation. The stream
of literature in agent-mediated electronic commerce is often tied to game-
theoretic modelling and our work aligns to it by proposing a personalised
rating model that is trustworthy by design.
Paper structure Section 2 presents the formal setup of the framework, intro-
ducing the notions of objective and personalised ratings, together with some
basic observations concerning their manipulability. Section 3 is devoted to ob-
jective rating, and shows the effect of bribes both in the presence of non-voters
and when all customers vote. Section 4 moves onto the study of personalised
rating. In particular, it compares the effect of bribes to the results on objective
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rating, emphasising the importance of a suitably defined notion of influence
weights between customers. It then shows how knowledge of the network plays
a role in determining the optimal bribing strategies and the cases in which one
does not exist. Our results are constructive: we give algorithms for determin-
ing effective bribing strategies and the computational complexity of doing so.
Section 5 extensively discusses the consequences of our definitions and results,
paying particular attention to the underlying assumptions on customers’ be-
haviour. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and presents a number of future
research directions.
2 Objective and Personalised Rating
In this section we provide the basic formal definitions of objective and per-
sonalised rating, and we give a formal definition of a bribing strategy and its
effect on ratings. We also define the revenue resulting from the execution of a
given bribing strategy, and we present some basic examples and first results
on the manipulability of the two rating systems that we have defined.
2.1 Restaurants and customers
Our framework features an external object r, the restaurant, which is evaluated
by a finite non-empty set of individuals C = {c1, . . . , cn}, called customers.
Customers are connected in a network E ⊆ C × C, called the customers net-
work. We assume E to be an undirected graph, i.e., the relation E is symmetric.
We also assume E to be reflexive, i.e., (c, c) ∈ E for all c ∈ C. Given c ∈ C we
call N(c) = {x ∈ C | (x, c) ∈ E} the neighbourhood of c. Note that this always
includes c itself.
Customers concurrently submit an evaluation of the restaurant, drawn
from a set of values Val ⊆ [0, 1], together with a distinguished element {∗},
which represents no opinion. Examples of sets of values are the set [0, 1] itself,
or a discrete assignment of 1 to 5 stars, as is common in online rating systems.
We make the assumption that {0, 1} ⊆ Val and that Val is closed under the
operation min{1, x+ y} for all x, y ∈ Val. These assumption allow us to map
the most common rating methods, e.g., 1 to 5 stars or any continuous bounded
set of values, onto the [0, 1] interval and analyse them within our framework.
We represent the customer evaluations as a function eval : C → Val ∪ {∗}
and define V ⊆ C as the subset of customers that express an evaluation of
the restaurant, i.e., V = {c ∈ C | eval(c) 6= ∗}. We refer to this set as the set
of voters and we assume it to be always non-empty, i.e., there is at least one
customer that expresses an opinion.
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2.2 Two rating systems
In online rating systems such as TripadvisorR© every interested customer can
see—and is therefore influenced by—(the average of) what the other customers
have written. We call this method O-rating, which stands for objective rating.





where avg is the average function across real-valued eval(c), disregarding ∗
and thus restricted to the set of voters V .
O-rating flattens individual evaluations into a unique objective aggregate,
the rating that a certain restaurant is given. What we propose is a refinement
of O-rating, which takes the network of influence into account. In this sys-
tem customers are only interested in the evaluation of other customers they
can trust, e.g., their friends. We call our method P-rating, which stands for
personalised rating. It is defined for a customer-evaluation pair (c, eval) as
follows.
P-rating(c, eval) = avg
k∈N(c)∩V
eval(k)
So, the P-rating(c, eval) give the opinion of a customer c on the restaurant,
taking the average of the opinions of the (voting) customers that c is connected
to. We omit eval whenever clear from the context, writing simply P-rating(c).
Observe that in case a customer is not connected to a voter, then P-rating
is not defined. To facilitate the analysis we make the technical assumption
that each customer is connected to at least one voter. Also observe that when
E = C ×C, i.e., in the case that the network is complete and each individual
is influenced by every other individual, then for all c ∈ C and eval we have
that P-rating(c, eval) = O-rating(eval).
Finally, note that while O-rating and P-rating are defined in terms of
average, different aggregators are possible and will be discussed in Section 5.
Example 1 Figure 1 shows three customers connected in a network. Two of
them, c1 and c2, have provided their own score of 0.9 and 0.3 respectively,
while c3 hasn’t. Given these evaluations we have
O-rating(eval) = avg
c∈V
eval(c) = avg{0.9, 0.3} = 0.6
while
P-rating(c1, eval) = P-rating(c2, eval) =
avg
k∈N(c1)∩V
eval(k) = avg{0.9, 0.3} = 0.6
and










Fig. 1 A network of three customers and their evaluations. The symbols above each node
represent the individual evaluations, the straight lines are the customers’ connections.
Notice how, despite a fairly positive objective rating of 0.6, customer c3 is influ-
enced by c2 only and therefore forms a more negative opinion of the restaurant.
Under the P-rating, each individual attaches equivalent importance to the
opinions of itself and each of its neighbours. There are many ways in which an
individual might aggregate the opinions of those it is influenced by, however
many of the interesting properties and limitations of network-based rating
systems can be seen by considering the restricted setting, as defined above.
Alternative methods of aggregation, for example, weighted variants of the P-
rating, and ideas for future work will be discussed in detail in Sections 5 and 6.
2.3 Utilities and strategies
We interpret a customer evaluation as a measure of his or her propensity to
go to the restaurant. We therefore assume that the utility that a restaurant
gets is proportional to its rating. To simplify the analysis we assume a factor
1 proportionality, that is to say the restaurant’s utility is equivalent to the
sum of all customers’ (personalised) ratings. We devote Section 5 to discuss
the impact and the relaxation of this and other simplifying assumptions.
2.3.1 The case of O-rating
For O-rating, we assume that the restaurant’s initial utility is defined as
u0O = |C|O-rating(eval).
Intuitively, the initial utility amounts to the number of customers that actually
go to the restaurant, weighted by their (average) predisposition. For example,
the initial utility of the restaurant with the customers’ evaluations as in Figure
1 is u0O = 3× 0.6 = 1.8.
At the initial stage of the game, the restaurant owner receives u0O, and
can then decide to invest a part of it to influence a subset of customers and
improve upon the initial utility. We assume utility to be fully transferable and,
to facilitate the analysis, that such transfers translate directly into changes in
customers’ evaluations.



















Fig. 2 The effect of a single bribe by 0.1 on each of the customers in Figure 1. The left (σA),
middle (σB) and right (σC) strategies, although costing the same (0.1) to the restaurant




O = 3 × 0.65 − 0.1 = 1.85 while u
σC
O =
3 × 0.43 − 0.1 = 1.2. Observe how the first two give a positive change with respect to the
original O-rating while the third one does not. Hence, σA and σB are profitable strategies
while σC is not.
Definition 1 A strategy is a function σ : C → Val such that
∑
c∈C σ(c) ≤ u0O.
Definition 1 imposes that strategies are weakly budget balanced, i.e., restaurants
can only pay with resources they have. We denote by σ0, the strategy that
assigns 0 to all customers and we call a bribing strategy any strategy that is
different from σ0. After the execution of a bribing strategy, the evaluation is
updated according to the following definition.
Definition 2 The evaluation evalσ(c) after the execution of σ is evalσ(c) =
min{1, eval(c) + σ(c)}, where ∗+ σ(c) = σ(c), if σ(c) 6= 0, and ∗+ σ(c) = ∗, if
σ(c) = 0.
In this definition we are making the assumption that the effect of bribing a
non-voter to vote is equivalent to that of bribing a voter that has an evaluation
of 0 as, intuitively, the individual has no associated predisposition to go to the
restaurant. Section 5 will discuss the extent of such assumption further.
A strategy is called efficient if σ(c) + eval(c) ≤ 1 for all c ∈ C. Let B(σ) =
{c ∈ C | σ(c) 6= 0} be the set of bribed customers, and let V σ be the set of







Intuitively, uσO is obtained by adding to the initial utility of the restaurant
the utility obtained from paying each customer, minus the amount of money
spent. Figure 2 shows an example of strategy executions and their effect on
O-rating.
We define the revenue of a strategy σ as the marginal utility obtained by
executing it.
Definition 3 Let σ be a strategy. The revenue of σ is defined as rO(σ) =
uσO − u0O. We say that σ is profitable if rO(σ) > 0.
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Considering the strategies in Figure 2, we have a revenue of 0.05 for both σA
and σB while the revenue is of −0.6 for σC , which is not a profitable bribing
strategy. Finally, we recall the standard notion of dominance and optimality.
Definition 4 A strategy σ weakly dominates a strategy σ′ if uσO ≥ uσ
′
O . A
strategy σ is weakly dominant or optimal if it weakly dominates every other
strategy σ′.
2.3.2 The case of P-rating
The previous definitions is lifted to the case of P-rating in the expected way.
In this case, we view the rating of the restaurant, which is now personalised
for each customer, as the propensity of the customer to visit the restaurant.





In the situation of Figure 1 we have that u0P =
∑
c∈C P-rating(c, eval) =
2 × 0.6 + 0.3 = 1.5. Assuming the same effect of a bribe on the customers’








Finally, let the revenue of a bribing strategy σ be rP (σ) = u
σ
P − u0P , with
profitable strategies being those generating a positive revenue. If it is clear from
the context, we use P-ratingσ(c) for P-rating(evalσ, c), i.e., the P-rating
obtained after the execution of bribing strategy σ.
Example 2 Let us consider the strategies displayed in Figure 2 and their ef-
fect on P-rating. Let us start with σA. We have that P-rating
σA(c1) =
P-ratingσA(c2) = 0.65 while P-rating
σA(c3) = 0.3. Note already how brib-
ing c1 does not affect c3, whose P-rating stays the same. We thus have that
uσAP = 1.5 = u
σ0
P , which means rP (σA) = 0 and thus σA is not a profitable
strategy. Observe also that any strategy that behaves like σA, bribing only cus-
tomer c1, gives either a zero or a negative revenue. Conversely, σB is different.
In this case, we also have that P-ratingσB (c1) = P-rating
σB (c2) = 0.65.
However, P-ratingσB (c3) = 0.4, which means that u
σB
P = 1.6 and thus
rP (σB) = 0.1. So, the strategy σB yields a positive revenue to the restaurant.
Finally, σC is such that P-rating
σC (c1) = 0.6, P-rating
σC (c2) = 0.43 and
P-ratingσC (c3) = 0.2, which means u
σC
P = 1.13 and thus rP (σB) = −0.36.
So, the strategy σC yields a negative revenue to the restaurant.
In later sections, in order to determine the optimal bribing strategies we
need to establish how the customers vote, how they are connected, and what
the restaurant owner knows. We assume that the restaurant knows eval , leav-
ing the interesting case of unknown eval to future work. We focus instead on
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the following cases: the restaurant knows the network, the restaurant knows
the shape of the network but not the individuals’ positions, and the network
is unknown. We analyse the effect of bribing strategies on P-rating in each
case. Notice how for the case of O-rating all collapse to the first. We also
look at the special case in which every customer is a voter. Given some set
of assumptions, we say that O-rating (or P-rating) is bribery-proof under
those assumptions if σ0 is optimal.
2.4 Charting the boundaries of manipulation
Bribing strategies have a different effect on the revenue obtained under the
two rating systems that we have defined. Whilst the utility of O-rating is
a sum of the global average of voters’ evaluations, the utility of P-rating
is a sum of local averages of voters’ evaluations based on the evaluations of
their peers. Therefore, a strategy bribing one voter affects everybody in the
case of O-rating, but it can be shown to have a limited effect in the case of
P-rating. In this section we provide initial results on evaluating the revenue
that can be obtained through bribing strategies in the two rating systems. We
begin with the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let σ be an efficient strategy s.t. |B(σ)| = 1, and let c̄ be such
that σ(c̄) 6= 0. Then rP (σ) < |N(c̄)|.
Proof By calculation, we have that:






















where the last step is obtained by observing that P-rating(c) ∈ [0, 1] and
σ(c̄) > 0.
The previous result shows that increasing the number of individuals that
are not connected to an agent that is being bribed, even if these are non-voters,
does not increase the upper bound on the revenue of the bribing strategy. This
is not true when we use O-rating.
Proposition 2 Let σ be an efficient strategy bribing voters only. The revenue
rO(σ) of σ is monotonically increasing in the number of non-voters.
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Proof It follows from our definitions that:
rO(σ) =
uσO − u0O =
|C|
∑
















The above figure is monotonically increasing in the number of non-voters,
which can be obtained by increasing C keeping V fixed.
A similar, albeit more complex, point can be made regarding strategies
that also bribe non-voters, as is explained in the following section. All in all,
under realistic assumptions on the network structure, such as a the presence
of a very large proportion of non-voters and with customers having a small
number of connections, we can already show that bribing under O-rating is
increasingly rewarding, while under P-rating this is no longer the case.
3 Manipulation of Objective Rating
In this section we consider bribing strategies under O-rating, first focussing
on the case where everyone expresses an opinion, then moving on to the more
general case. In the first case we show that O-rating is bribery-proof, and for
the second we give an efficient algorithm to compute optimal bribing strategies.
3.1 All vote
Let us now consider the case in which V = C. First, we show the following
result.
Proposition 3 If V = C, then no strategy is profitable.
12 Grandi, Stewart, and Turrini











































Each step is a straightforward consequence of our definitions. Observe that
any efficient bribing strategy has revenue of exactly zero. From this it follows
that σ0 is optimal and therefore O-rating is bribery-proof in the case that
all customers vote.
3.2 Non-voters
We now consider the case of V ⊂ C, i.e., when there is at least one customer
who is not a voter. The following example shows that O-rating, in this case,
is not bribery-proof, and that the order in which customers are bribed matters,
suggesting that finding an optimal bribing strategy might be a non-trivial task.
Example 3 Let C = {A,B,C}, and let eval(A) = 0.5, eval(B) = 0.5, and
eval(C) = ∗. The initial resources are u0 = O-rating × 3 = 1.5. Now let
σ1(A) = 0.5 and σ1(B) = σ1(C) = 0, and let σ2(C) = 0.5 and σ2(A) =
σ2(B) = 0. Now, u
σ1
O = 0.75× 3− 0.5 = 1.75 and u
σ2
O = 0.5× 3− 0.5 = 1, but
uσ1◦σ2O = 0.6̄× 3− 1 = 1.
This example (in particular σ1) also shows that O-rating, in this case, is
not bribery-proof.
We now characterise the set of optimal bribing strategies. We begin by
showing that bribing a non-voter is always dominated. First, let σ be a strategy
such that σ(c̄) 6= 0 for some c ∈ C \ V and recall that V σ is the set of voters
after execution of σ. Let us define the c-greedy restriction of σ to be any
strategy σ−c̄ such that:
– V σ
−c̄
= V σ \ {c}, i.e., the greedy restriction eliminates c̄ from the set of
voters.
– For each c ∈ V σ \ {c}, max{1, eval(c) + σ(c)} = max{1, eval(c) + σ−c̄(c)},
i.e., the greedy restriction does not waste further resources.




c∈C σ(c), i.e., the σ
−c̄ redistributes σ(c̄) among the remaining voters.
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We now show that each strategy bribing a non-voter is strictly dominated by
any of its greedy restrictions.
Proposition 4 Let V 6= C, and c̄ ∈ C \ V . Then each σ with σ(c) 6= 0 is
strictly dominated by σ−c̄.
Proof Let σ be a strategy with σ(c) 6= 0 for some non-voter c, and let σ−c̄ be
one of its greedy restriction defined above.
uσ
−c̄




































i.e., the second addendum in the above equation is positive. Consider now the
case where there exists c ∈ V σ \ {c} such that eval(c) + σ−c̄(c) < 1. Then







i.e., the greedy restriction preserves the overall evaluation. By straightforward
calculation this gives that uσ
−c̄
O − uσO > 0. If no such c exists, and therefore
O-ratingσ
−c̄
= 1 we have that either O-ratingσ < 1 or, by the efficiency re-






In either case we have that uσ
−c̄
O − uσO > 0.
Let an O-greedy strategy be any efficient strategy that redistributes all the
initial resources u0O among voters. Making use of the previous result, we are
able to characterise the set of all optimal strategies for O-rating.
Proposition 5 Let V 6= C and σ a strategy. The following three statements
are equivalent:
(i) σ is optimal for O-rating,
(ii) σ is an O-greedy strategy,
(iii) σ yields a payoff of
(
|C|





Proof By Proposition 4 we know that strategies bribing non-voters are dom-
inated. Therefore we can restrict ourselves to strategies bribing only voters.
Clearly, inefficient strategies are dominated. By Proposition 2 the revenue of
an efficient strategy bribing only voters is
(
|C|





that to maximise this quantity, we need to maximise
∑
c∈C σ(c). This means
bribes need to reach a total of min{u0O,
∑
c∈V (1− eval(c)), which corresponds
to the definition of an O-greedy strategy.
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While there may be cases in which the number of optimal strategies un-
der O-rating is exponential, all such strategies yields the same revenue, and
Proposition 5 gives us a polynomial-time algorithm to find one of them: start-
ing from an evaluation vector eval , distribute all available resources u0O to the
voters, without exceeding the maximal evaluation of 1. By either exhausting
the available budget or distributing it all, we are guaranteed the maximum
gain by Proposition 5.
4 Manipulation of Personalised Rating
In this section we analyse the effect of bribing strategies under P-rating.
Unlike the case of O-rating, where a complete underlying graph is implicitly
assumed, P-rating is defined upon an underlying network that may or may
not be known to the external attacker.
We begin by looking at the case where the network is known and, as we
have done in Section 3, we first study the case when everyone votes and then
move on to allowing non-voters. Subsequently, we lift the assumption that the
network is known to the attacker, first looking at the case in which the network
shape is known but the customers’ positions are unknown, and then remove
any knowledge of the underlying network altogether. For each of these cases
we look at the potential for manipulation and its feasibility in practice, i.e.,
the computational complexity of computing a profitable bribing strategy.
Before we proceed, we introduce a useful graph-theoretic measure of influ-
ence and a closed form for calculating the utility of a bribing strategy.
Definition 5 The influence weight of a customer c ∈ C in a network E with





|N(k) ∩ V |
Recall, we assumed that every customer can see a voter, thus wVc is well-
defined for every c. If V = C, i.e., when everybody voted, we let wc = w
C
c . In




deg(k) , where deg(c) = |N(c)| is the degree
of c in E. When V is defined by a bribing strategy σ, we write wσc = w
V σ
c .
Intuitively, each individual’s individual rating influences the rating of each
of its connections, with a factor that is inversely proportional to the number
of second-level connections that have expressed an evaluation. We formalise
this statement in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The utility obtained by playing bribing strategy σ with P-rating














































4.1 All vote, known network
We begin by studying the simplest case in which every customer has expressed
an opinion, the restaurant owner knows the evaluation eval , and the restaurant
owner knows the position of each customer on the network, and therefore the
influence between customers. Recall that B(σ) is the set of customers bribed
by σ. We say that two strategies σ1 and σ2 are disjoint if B(σ1) ∩B(σ2) = ∅.
Given two disjoint strategies σ1 and σ2, we denote σ1 ◦σ2 their concatenation,
i.e., the strategy (σ1 ◦ σ2) such that (σ1 ◦ σ2)(c) = σ1(c), whenever σ1(c) 6= 0,
and (σ1◦σ2)(c) = σ2(c), otherwise. The following corollary is a straightforward
consequence of Lemma 1:
Corollary 1 Let V = C and let σ1 and σ2 be two disjoint strategies, then
rP (σ1 ◦ σ2) = rP (σ1) + rP (σ2).
We are now able to give a precise characterisation of the revenue obtained by
any efficient strategy σ.
Proposition 6 Let V = C, let E be a known network, and let σ be an efficient
strategy. Then rP (σ) =
∑
c∈C(wc − 1)σ(c).
Proof By calculation, where Step (2) uses Lemma 1, and Step (4) uses the
fact that σ is efficient:
rP (σ) = u
σ


























(wc − 1)σ(c). (4)











Fig. 3 A four-arm star.
Proposition 6 tells us that the factors wc are crucial in determining the
revenue of a given bribing strategy. Bribing a customer c is profitable whenever
wc > 1 (provided its evaluation was not 1 already), whilst bribing a customer
c with wc ≤ 1 is at most as profitable as doing nothing, as can be seen in the
example below. Most importantly, it shows that P-rating is not bribery-proof
when the restaurant knows both the network and the customers’ evaluations.
Example 4 Let E be the four-arm star depicted in Figure 3, with A being
the distinguished individual in the centre and with each customer giving an
evaluation of 0.5. We have that wA = 2.2 and wc = 0.7 for all c different from
A. Consider now two bribing strategies: σA which bribes A with 0.5, and σB
which bribes a single individual B 6= A with the same amount. By Lemma 1,
the utility we obtain is rP (σ
A) = 0.6, whilst rP (σ
B) = −0.15. This shows
that a bribe is profitable only if the influence weight of the bribed customer is
bigger than 1.
Given a network E and an evaluation vector eval , let Algorithm 1 define
the P -greedy bribing strategy. Note that we make use of the notion of influence
weight of Definition 5.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 6 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2 The P -greedy bribing strategy defined in Algorithm 1 is optimal.
As is the case for O-rating, Corollary 2 has repercussions on the computa-
tional complexity of bribery: it shows that computing an optimal strategy can
be done in polynomial-time. Notice how the most costly operation lies in the
computation of the influence weights wc, which can be performed only once,
assuming the network is static. Similar problems, such as recognising whether
bribing a certain individual is profitable, or estimating whether individuals on
a network can be bribed above a certain threshold, are also efficiently com-
putable.
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Input: Evaluation function eval and network E
Output: A bribing strategy σGP : C → Val
Budget=u0P
σGP (c) = 0 for all c ∈ C
Compute wc for all c ∈ C
Sort c ∈ C in descending order c0, . . . , cm based on wc
for i=0,. . . ,m do
if Budget6= 0 then
if wci > 1 then

















Fig. 4 A star with a non-voter in the centre.
4.2 Non-voters, known network
While we showed in Section 3 that bribing a non-voter is never optimal under
objective rating, the following example shows that under P-rating there exist
networks for which the optimal bribe is to a non-voter.
Example 5 Consider four individuals {B,C,D,E} connected only to a non-
voter A in the middle, with eval(j) = 0.2 for all j 6= A, as shown in Figure 4.
We have u0P = 1. Let σ1(A) = 1 and 0 otherwise. The utility of σ1 is:
P-ratingσ1(A) + 4P-ratingσ1(j)− 1 = 1.76
where j = B,C,D,E. All other strategies can be shown to be dominated by
σ1. Take for instance a strategy σ2 such that σ2(B) = 0.8, σ2(C) = 0.2 and 0
otherwise. The utility of σ2 is u
σ2
P = 1.25.
The computation of bribing strategies involving non-voters is highly non-
trivial. We begin by investigating restricted classes of strategies, in particular
the ones only bribing voters and the ones bribing a single customer only.
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4.2.1 Voter-only strategies
Let voter-only strategies be bribing strategies σ such that σ(c) = 0 for all
c 6∈ V . In this case, a similar proof to Proposition 6 gives the following result.
Proposition 7 Let V 6= C, E be a known network, and let σ be an efficient





The difference with the case of V = C is that wVc can be arbitrarily large in
the presence of non-voters, such as in Example 5.
4.2.2 Single Bribes
We now investigate how much revenue can be gained by bribing a single cus-
tomer with an efficient strategy. To ease the notation, for each y ∈ N(x) set
νy = |N(x) ∩ V |. We begin by reformulating Proposition 7 for the case of
bribing one single voter:
Proposition 8 Let V ⊆ C, let x ∈ V , and let σ be an efficient bribing strategy
such that σ(x) = b > 0 and σ(y) = 0, for all y ∈ C \ {x}. Then,









We then move to computing the revenue gained by (efficiently) by bribing
a solo non-voter:
Proposition 9 Let V ⊆ C, let x ∈ C \ V , and let σ be an efficient bribing
strategy such that σ(x) = b > 0 and σ(y) = 0, for all y ∈ C \ {x}. Then,




















Proof By definition of revenue of a bribing strategy, we have that:













Given that σ bribes exactly one customer x, only the P-rating of cus-


























where the last equality follows by simply applying the definition of P-rating.
For any y ∈ N(x), let us denote |N(y) ∩ V σ| by νσy ; so, νσy = νy + 1. Hence,





























































and the result follows.
Proposition 8 shows that for some fixed amount, the extent to which a
voter is profitable to bribe can be expressed as a function of only the network
structure (by this we refer to the topology of the network and the positions of
non-voters on the network). Contrary to this, Proposition 9 shows that in order
to express the revenue obtained by bribing a non-voter it is also necessary to
know the evaluation of the neighbouring customers.
4.2.3 Independence of Bribing Order
We now explore whether the order of bribing customers impacts the resulting
revenue, obtaining the following result:
Proposition 10 Let V ⊆ C, let x, x′ ∈ C be distinct customers, and let σ be
an efficient strategy such that σ(x) = b > 0, σ(x′) = b′ > 0, and σ(y) = 0, for
all y ∈ C \ {x, x′}. No matter whether we bribe x before x′ or x′ before x, the
resulting cumulative revenue will be the same.
The proof of Proposition 10, reported in Appendix A, shows that, despite
the fact that bribing non-voters transforms the set of voters, we can ignore the
order of bribes when evaluating the effect of a strategy. A useful reformulation
of this fact is the following statement: given two bribing strategies σ1 and σ2
and two distinct customers x, x′ ∈ C, if σ1 only bribes customer x and σ2 only
bribes x′, then rP (σ1 ◦ σ2) = rP (σ2 ◦ σ1).
4.2.4 A (Non-Optimal) Greedy Algorithm
By Proposition 10, bribing strategies involving multiple customers can be de-
composed by looking at strategies bribing a single one, which can then be
executed without attention to the order. This fact suggests that a greedy al-
gorithm could be proposed to find optimal strategies. First, select the customer
who will yield the highest revenue when bribed the maximal amount allowed
by the initial budget and their own evaluation, using the formulas obtained in
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Propositions 8 and 9. Note that this could be either a voter or a non-voter.
Then, repeat the process until the initial budget is exhausted, or until all indi-
viduals on the network who do not have maximal evaluation yield a negative
revenue when bribed. Call this procedure the non-voters greedy algorithm.
This simple idea, which was shown to yield an optimal bribing strategy in
case every customer votes (Corollary 2), does not yield an optimal strategy in
the presence of non-voters, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 11 The non-voters greedy algorithm is not optimal.
The proof of Proposition 11 is reported in Appendix B. What is left open is
the question of whether we can find an optimal bribing strategy in polynomial-
time, or decide whether there exists a successful manipulation strategy in
polynomial-time, or, instead, whether there might be a complexity-theoretic
barrier to doing so. As the the following section shows, the latter is true.
4.2.5 Finding optimal manipulation strategies for P-rating
We now investigate, from a complexity theoretic point of view, the problem of
computing a bribing strategy yielding at least some given revenue, when not
every customer votes and the restaurant has full knowledge of each customer’s
position. This, notice, will allow us to determine the existence of both a suc-
cessful manipulation strategy and an optimal strategy. Firstly, we reformulate
the above optimization problem as a decision problem.
BRIBE-NVKL
Instance: Network (C,E), evaluation eval0, ρ ∈ Q
Yes-Instance: An instance of BRIBE-NVKL s.t. there exists a strat-
egy σ with r(σ) ≥ ρ
Any instance of the above problem should adhere to the usual restrictions
of the framework. These are, most importantly, that the initial evaluation is
such that every customer c ∈ C is adjacent to at least one customer c′ ∈ C
such that eval(c′) 6= ∗ (recall that every customer is adjacent to itself). Also,
any strategy σ is such that
∑
c∈C σ(c) is at most the initial utility resulting
from eval0.
In what follows, we show that BRIBE-NVKL is NP-complete, by giving
a reduction from the known NP-complete problem of finding an independent
set on 3-regular graphs, aka ISREG(3) (Garey and Johnson, 1990).
Recall that a graph G is 3-regular if the degree of every vertex is 3, and an
independent set of G is a subset X of its vertices such that there is no edge of
G joining any pair of vertices in X. We can now give the following definition:
ISREG(3)
Instance: A 3-regular graph G, k ∈ N
Yes-Instance: An instance of ISREG(3) such that G has an indepen-
dent set of size at least k
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We now prove the main result of this section (part of the proof is reported in
Appendix C):
Theorem 1 BRIBE-NVKL is NP-complete.
Proof We begin by giving a reduction from an arbitrary instance of ISREG(3)
to an instance of BRIBE-NVKL. That is, given a 3-regular graph G and
k ∈ N, we construct a network (C,E), an initial evaluation eval0, and ρ ∈ Q
such that G has an independent set of size at least k ⇐⇒ there exists a
strategy on ((C,E), eval0) that yields a revenue of at least ρ. Given a 3-regular
graph G, we define a network of customers as follows:
Customers The set C of customers is composed of old, pendant, and edge
cutomers. For all vertices v ∈ G, we create an old customer v ∈ C, as
well as a set of pendant customers v1, .., vn ∈ C, where n is the number
of vertices of G. For each edge (u, v) of G, we introduce an edge customer
wu,v ∈ C.
Network The network E relating customers is defined as follows. For each old
customer v, there is an edge (v, vi) ∈ E for i = 1, 2, ..., n, connecting it to
the related pendant customers. For every edge (u, v) of G, we add (u,wu,v)



























Fig. 5 The network of customers associated to a portion of a 3-regular graph, focusing on
vertices {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} and edges {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), (x2, x4), (x1, x5)}. Full nodes are
old customers, empty nodes are pendant customers, and dashed nodes are edge customers.
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For any such network as constructed above, we can define an initial eval-
uation eval0 as follows, where 0 < ε < 1 is some value that will be set later in
the proof.
– If c ∈ C is an old customer then eval0(c) = ∗ (non-voter).
– If c ∈ C is an edge or pendant customer then eval0(c) = ε.
An example of the construction of the customer network and evaluation
from a graph G can be seen in Figure 5.
By the construction of the network, we have that for all c ∈ C, the P -
rating(c, eval0) = ε (recall that we assumed c ∈ N(c) for all customers). Every
customer of the newly constructed customer network contributes ε to the initial
utility of the network and therefore u0P = ε(n+n
2+ 3n2 ). Note that the additive
factor 3n2 is a consequence of the assumption of 3-regularity of the graph. We
now choose ε so that u0P = k; that is, so that
ε =
k
n+ n2 + 3n2
.
By assumption the restaurant owner can only make bribes totalling at most
k. Furthermore, note that the initial evaluation is a valid one in that every
customer of the network is adjacent to at least one voter. Finally, let









( =⇒ ) Suppose that our instance (G, k) of ISREG(3) is a yes-instance;
that is, there is a set I of at least k vertices such that no two vertices of I are
adjacent in G. Consider the bribing strategy for (C,E) (as constructed above)
where σ(c) = 1, for every old customer corresponding to some vertex of I, and
σ(c′) = 0 for all other c′ ∈ C.
Let us now compute the revenue obtained by σ. Recall that the revenue
is equal to the increase in P-rating of the bribed customers and their neigh-
bourhoods (old, pendant, and edge customers), minus the cost of the bribe.
The cumulative increase in rating of bribed old customers is:
k
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Recall that bribed old customers correspond to an independent set in G. Sum-









− k = ρ.
Therefore ((C,E), eval0, ρ) is a yes-instance of NVKL.
(⇐= ) To ease readability we leave this more articulate part to Appendix C.
Finally, it is easy to see that BRIBE-NVKL is in NP. Given a customer
network (C,E), an evaluation eval , and ρ ∈ Q, we can clearly decide whether
a given strategy σ yields a revenue of at least ρ in polynomial-time (we simply
evaluate the strategy).
In summary, we have been able to prove the NP-completeness of BRIBE-
NVKL by giving a reduction from ISREG(3). This is an important finding,
that significantly strengthens the value of personalised rating systems and
their resistance to bribery, as we have demonstrated that we cannot compute
an optimal bribing strategy, nor any strategy guaranteeing at least a given
reward, in a reasonable amount of time; that is, of course, unless P = NP.
4.3 All vote, unknown network
We now move onto studying the more complex case of an unknown network,
starting from a situation in which every customer expresses an opinion. Sur-
prisingly, we are able to show that no bribing strategy is profitable (in expec-
tation), and hence P-rating is bribery-proof in this case.
We begin by assuming that the restaurant knows the structure of the net-
work, but not the position of each customer. Formally, the restaurant knows E,
but considers any permutation of the customers in C over E as being possible.
Let us define the expected revenue of a strategy σ over a given network E as the






where we abuse notation by writing uσρ as u
σ
P under permutation ρ over the
network E. What we are able to show is that, in expectation, no strategy is
more profitable that σ0.
Proposition 12 Let V = C, let the network structure of E be known but not
the relative positions of customers on E. Then E[rP (σ)] = 0 for all strategies σ.
Proof Let |C| = n. We first show that the result for any strategy σ that bribes
a single customer c̄ is zero, and the general statement follows from the linearity
of E[r(σ)] and the additivity of the revenue. Let therefore σ be a single bribe
to a customer. By Proposition 6 we can compute the expected revenue of σ
for each permutation ρ of customers C on the network, assuming that each



















Fig. 6 Customers permutations in Example 6.






















(wc − 1) = 0 (6)
Where c̄ in equation (5) is the only customer receiving a bribe under per-
mutation ρ, and the equation (6) follows from the observation that, under the
assumption that every customer voted,
∑
c wc = |C| and hence
∑
c(wc−1) = 0.
Hence, if we assume a uniform probability over all permutations of cus-
tomers on the network, a straightforward consequence of Proposition 12 con-
cludes that it is not profitable (in expectation) to bribe any customer.
Corollary 3 If V = C and the network is unknown, then no bribing strategy
for P-rating is profitable in expected return.
4.4 Non voters, unknown network
Unlike the case of V = C, in this case it is possible to define bribing strategies
for P-rating that are profitable (in expected return).
Example 6 Let C = {A,B,C}, and the initial evaluation eval(A) = eval(B) =
0.2 and eval(C) = ∗. Assume that the structure of the network is known, but
the position of the individuals is not. Let the three possible network positions
(without counting the symmetries) be depicted in Figure 6. Let σ(B) = 0.2
and σ(A) = σ(C) = 0. In the first case
r1P (σ) = P-rating(A) + ...+ P-rating(C)− 0.2− u
0
P
= 0.3 + 0.3 + 0.4− 0.2− 0.6
= 0.2,
in the second case r2P (σ) = 0, whilst in the third case
r3P (σ) = 0.4 + 0.3 + 0.2− 0.2− 0.6 = 0.1.
Personalised Rating 25
Therefore, P-rating is not bribery-proof (in expectation) in the presence
of non-voters when the network is unknown. Interesting computational prob-
lems therefore open up in this setting. Finding optimal bribing strategies in
the presence of non-voters is already computationally hard when the network
is known, as shown by Theorem 1. We therefore focus on the problem of find-
ing profitable (but not necessarily optimal) strategies under the assumption
of incomplete knowledge of the network.
We start from the assumption that the restaurant knows the network topol-
ogy of the network but does not know the location of each customer on the
network. We also assume that the restaurant owner knows the overall utility,
and we ask the question of whether it is possible to compute in polynomial-
time an assignment of evaluations to customers such that the resulting utility
of this assignment is equal to the one the restaurant owner knows about.
More formally, we assume that the restaurant knows the topology of the
network of influence, that is, E ⊆ N×N , where here N is the set of (unnamed)
customers. So, we can think of our network as a graph where there are no
customer names on the vertices. The restaurant knows the evaluation function
eval : C → V al ∪ {∗}, however it does not know where each customers name
sits within the network. That is, the restaurant owner is missing a bijection
between N and C. We define the following problem:
Utility Placement (UPLACE)
Instance: An unlabelled network (N,E), evaluation eval, target
utility b ∈ Q
Yes-Instance: An instance of UPLACE s.t. there is a bijection ρ
from N to C such that (a) every customer is adja-
cent to at least one voting customer on the network
E labelled by ρ, and (b) the utility resulting from the
assignment is at least b.
We now show that UPLACE is NP-complete by giving a simple reduction
from the vertex dominating set problem, which is a known NP-hard problem
defined as follows (Garey and Johnson, 1990):
Vertex Dominating Set (VDS)
Instance: A graph G with n vertices, k ∈ N such that k ≤ n
Yes-Instance: An instance of VDS s.t. there is a subset S of k ver-
tices of G such that every vertex not in S is adjacent
to at least one vertex of S.
Proposition 13 UPLACE is NP-complete.
Proof Given any instance (G, k) of VDS we construct a customer network
C = G. We define eval = (1, ..., 1) ∈ Rk and let b = k. Let (C, eval, b) be
an instance of UPLACE. If (G, k) has a vertex dominating set of size k then
clearly the assignment of 1 to each customer corresponding to a vertex of the
dominating set would give us a utility of b ≥ k in C. Conversely, if G has
no vertex dominating set of size k then there is no assignment of evaluations
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1’s to customers such that condition (a) in the definition of UPLACE holds.
That is, (C, eval, b) is not a yes-instance of UPLACE. Since VDS is NP-hard
it follows that UPLACE is NP-hard. Given an instance of UPLACE we can
clearly check in non-determinstic polynomial time whether the utility of C
with respect to eval is ≥ b. We can therefore deduce that UPLACE is in NP
thus concluding the proof.
In conclusion, despite the fact that P-rating is theoretically manipulable
with full knowledge of the network and even more so in presence of non-voters,
the lack of knowledge of the underlying network structure contributes to its
non-manipulability in practice, even when the network structure is known but
the attacker is faced with the problem of deducing the individuals’ locations.
4.5 Stocktaking
We have analysed the manipulability of P-rating with full knowledge of the
underlying network, with and without non-voters. We have seen that in this
case there are situations in which the rating system is manipulable. How-
ever, while we were able to give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing
optimal bribing strategies when everyone voted (Corollary 2), the presence of
non-voters makes this problem NP-complete (Theorem 1). Finding profitable,
albeit suboptimal, strategies is easy, and we provided closed formulas for the
computation of the generated revenue (Propositions 8 and 9).
Finally, we investigated the case of incomplete knowledge of the network,
showing that P-rating is bribery-proof if everyone votes (Proposition 12),
but that reconstructing the evaluation of customers when their location on the
network is unknown is an intractable computational problem (Proposition 13).
5 Discussing the Underlying Assumptions
Our model is built upon a number of simplifying assumptions, some of which
require non-trivial extensions, while some others can be generalised without
affecting the overall applicability of the framework. Among the former we in-
clude: the effect of time on agents’ decisions, both of the customers, as their
view of the restaurant and of the other customers may change after observing
the quality of the service provided, and the restaurant itself, as the knowl-
edge of the network is bound to change with new information coming in; the
presence of multiple restaurants, therefore giving rise to a game, albeit not
necessarily fully competitive; the graph dynamics, as agents’ might reconsider
their friendships as well. There are however simplifying assumptions that can
be lifted without altering the main message: i.e., that uncertainty of the un-
derlying network structure makes P-rating resistant to manipulation. The
following is a non-exhaustive list of the main ones.
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Directed weighted graphs We assumed undirected connections where the rela-
tive importance of customers in their neighbours’ decisions is the same. This
can be generalised to networks E ⊆ C×C that are not necessarily symmetric.
This means that each customer c will have a neighbour N in(c) of incoming con-
nections that influence them. At the same time, c will influence a set Nout(c) of
outgoing connections, possibly different than N in(c). On top of that, for each
c, members k of N in(c) also have a relative importance, which we denote as
Ikc, meaning how important k’s evaluation is for c. Ikc comes with some nat-
ural assumptions, in particular that ∀k, c : Ikc ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
k∈N in(c) Ikc = 1.
Observe that this more general model allows us to raise arbitrarily the relative
weight of each loop Icc, lifting our assumption that a customer is as influenced
by his or her neighbours’ opinions as by his or her own one.
Despite the fact that a customers’ importance is normalised, the calculation
of P-rating needs to take into account the fact that some of the incoming





k∈N in (c)∩V Ikc
Considering the degrees of importance that we just introduced, the customer





k′∈N in(k)∩V σ Ik′k
in order to obtain, once again, by similar calculation as in the proof of Propo-






c∈C σ(c). In particular, whenever
V = C, we obtain that wσc =
∑
k∈Nout Ick, i.e., the influence weight of a cus-
tomer is its weighted out-degree.
In conclusion, our results and techniques can be applied to the more general
case of weighted directed networks, adapting the calculations as described
above. In particular, we remark that the hardness of bribery established in
Section 4 carries through to the weighted setting.
Aggregation rules Customers’ personalised ratings aggregate the average of
their voting connections. The choice of the average as aggregation rule is a
simplifying one and the previous paragraph has shown that it can be naturally
lifted to weighted graphs, and thus to weighted averages. We also note how
average-based aggregators have a long tradition in social network analysis
and a number of impactful contributions have used it to formulate plausible
computational models. Notable examples include the polarization model of
Axelrod (1997), the belief mixtures of Deffuant et al. (2000) and the opinion
aggregation dynamics model in Hegselmann and Krause (2002).
There are a number of different approaches one can take towards aggre-
gating evaluations from trusted peers. Garcin et al. (2009) suggested the use
of median voter (the median evaluation among the given ones) to aggregate







Fig. 7 Personalised ratings with median aggregator is not bribery proof
reputation feedback, emphasising the fact that the median voter is strategy-
proof. Although we acknowledge their point, we can show that the use of the
median in the calculation of the P-rating is not bribery proof either. Figure
7 gives an example of a fully connected network where the median vote is 0.5
for all customers. However any bribe of 0.5 to any of the customers voting 0.5
already brings the utility from 1.5 to 3. Notice how this shows that, unlike in
the case of the average, the median is not even bribery proof with O-rating
when all customers vote.
Similar points can be made for variants of personalised rating built on the
mode, i.e., the most frequent appearing evaluation and, as shown, weighted
average, concluding the list of four most common aggregators for reputation
feedback (Garcin et al., 2009).
Linear responses Our framework assumes linearity of behaviour in various
ways, notably: (i) customers’ ratings correspond to their propensity to go to
the restaurant, and (ii) bribe σ(c) affects evaluation eval(c) linearly. These
assumptions can be generalised by multiplicative factors, such as an average
price R paid at the restaurant, a propensity to use the service, and a customer
price.
Let us begin with the customer price, encoding the response to bribes. Let
µc ∈ [0,∞) encode the relative effect of a bribed sum on a customer. This is
such that, for any strategy σ,
evalσ(c) = min(1, eval(c) + µcσ(c)).
So, the old evaluation is updated with the bribe multiplied by the customer
response, capped at 1. Note that µc = 0 encodes customers who do not accept
bribes. Our methods also work in this case. To showcase this fact, we can





which means that a bribe is profitable if and only if it is given to customers
with wcµc > 1.
Regarding the propensity to use the service, we can associate to each cus-
tomer a propensity value πc ∈ [−1, 1], which encodes their reaction to their
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own P-rating which is then reflected on the utility perceived by the restau-








πcP-rating(c) if πc ≤ 0
πc(1−P-rating(c)) if πc > 0.
In other words, each customer will go to the restaurant based on their P-rating,
discounted by their own reaction to it—increasing the original P-rating if πc
is positive, and decreasing it otherwise. Profitable bribing strategies can be
found by similar calculations to those in previous sections, taking the dis-
counting factor into account.
Various other constraints Another assumption that can be removed without
loss of generality is the reflexivity of connections, i.e., the fact that a customer
is necessarily influenced by its own personal opinion. Notice this is equivalent to
setting Icc = 0 in the previously discussed case of weighted networks. Likewise,
the same reasoning applies for customers that are already voters, and thus
we might want to have them place higher importance on their own personal
opinion.
Finally, the constraint of a non-voter being connected to at least one voter
might seem demanding. To tackle this with more generality, one could de-
fine a k-neighbourhood notion of influence—with P-rating calculations lifted
accordingly—or simply provide these customers with the O-rating only. This
would also provide a solution to the cold-start problem affecting any person-
alised approach to ratings, driving customers to submit reviews until a suffi-
cient number of voters filled most neighbourhoods. Once again, this constraint
is a technical assumption that heavily facilitates calculations, but could in gen-
eral be dispensed with.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We introduced Personalised Rating, a network-based rating system which gen-
eralises the commonly used Objective Rating, and analysed its resistance to
external attacks under various conditions.
Our results show that the introduction of an underlying network struc-
ture to constrain the available information has clear advantages in terms of
the trustworthiness of the resulting rating. In particular, we have shown that
while P-rating and O-rating are not bribery-proof in general, the former
has a clear upper bound on the profit that can be made by external influ-
ence (Propositions 1 and 2), even if the external attacker has access to the
underlying network. The reliability of P-rating increases with the incom-
plete knowledge of the attacker. We have shown that as long as the restaurant
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owner does not know the customers’ positions in a network — and, there-
fore, even if they know the full structure of the network — P-rating is not
manipulable when all customers vote, (Proposition 12) which, coupled with
our findings in the presence of non-voters, shows a clear advantage to the use
of network-based rating systems. We have also looked at situations in which
manipulation is possible in theory, but may, in general, be computationally
infeasible in practice. Specifically, unlike the case of O-rating, the problem
of manipulation under P-rating with full knowledge of the network is in-
tractable, as we know from showing that BRIBE-NVKL is NP-complete.
This, we find, is a major strengthening for the practical applicability of the
personalised rating framework.
It has to be emphasised that our results are confined to worst-case com-
plexity analysis and it is therefore necessary to analyse alternative methods for
manipulation. These include studying the parameterized complexity analysis
of various subproblems (Faliszewski and Niedermeier, 2014). Alternatively, we
can investigate the problem of approximate bribing strategies. It could be pos-
sible that something can still be salvaged of the P -greedy approach, or, that
we find it is still computationally hard to even compute a bribing strategy
that yields a revenue that is within some factor of a given amount. We saw
through our Proposition 11 that whilst not yielding the optimal amount of
revenue, we can still compute a profitable return. We can approach this ques-
tion from a slightly less formal but nevertheless important angle and seek to
obtain a number of experimental results concerning the performance of greedy
algorithms. The results on Personalised Rating demonstrate the impact of in-
complete knowledge in deterring manipulation. This suggests the importance
of devising ways to induce uncertainty for the attacker, with respect to the
network structure and the individuals’ evaluations. The study of probabilistic
aggregation methods, along the lines of Barberà (1979) and Fishburn (1984),
is therefore an important future research direction.
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Appendix A - Proof of Proposition 10
Proposition Let V ⊆ C, let x, x′ ∈ C be distinct customers, and let σ be an
efficient strategy such that σ(x) = b > 0, σ(x′) = b′ > 0, and σ(y) = 0, for
all y ∈ C \ {x, x′}. No matter whether we bribe x before x′ or x′ before x, the
resulting cumulative revenue will be the same.
Proof We show that, if σ is a strategy bribing only two customers x and x′, the
order of bribes does not influence the resulting revenue. We reason by cases. If
x, x′ ∈ V , i.e., both bribed cutomers are voters, the independence of the order
is a straightforward consequence of Proposition 7.
Let us then consider the case of bribing two non-voters. Let therefore x, x′ ∈
C \V , and let σ be an efficient strategy such that σ(x) = b > 0, σ(x′) = b′ > 0,
and σ(y) = 0, for all y ∈ C \ {x, x′}. Suppose that we bribe x first. By





















where we recall that for each y ∈ N(x) ∪ N(x′), νy is defined as |N(y) ∩ V |.
Denote the evaluation obtained after bribing x by eval′ and the resulting set of
voters by V ′; in particular, eval′ differs from eval only on x and V ′ = V ∪{x}.
For each y ∈ N(x′), define ν′y as |N(y) ∩ V ′|. So, again by Proposition 9, the
additional revenue r2 acquired by bribing x
























Note that any ν′y depends upon whether y ∈ N(x′) ∩ N(x) or whether
y ∈ N(x′) \ N(x): in the former case, ν′y = νy + 1; and in the latter case,
ν′y = νy. Consequently

















































































Now we have that



































































We can now conclude the first part of the proof, since by the symmetry of
the expression for r1 + r2, were we to first bribe x
′ and then x, we would get
exactly the same revenue.
Now we consider the case where we compare bribing a non-voter x and then
a voter x′ with bribing the voter x′ and then the non-voter x. Let therefore
x ∈ C \V , let x′ ∈ V , and let σ be an efficient strategy such that σ(x) = b > 0,
σ(x′) = b′ > 0, and σ(y) = 0, for all y ∈ C \ {x, x′}. Suppose that we
first bribe the voter x′ with b′, to acquire revenue r1, before bribing the non-
voter x with b, to acquire revenue r2. Denote the evaluation obtained from
eval by bribing x′ by eval′; so, eval′ is identical to eval except on x′ where
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eval′(x′) = eval(x′) + b′. Note also that the set of voters has not changed. By
Proposition 8 and Proposition 9, we obtain
































































Now suppose that we first bribe the non-voter x with b, to acquire revenue s1,






















Denote the evaluation obtained from eval by bribing x by eval′, denote the set
of voters after bribing x by V ′, and for every y ∈ N(x′), set ν′y as |N(y)∩V ′|;
so, eval′ is identical to eval except on x, where eval′(x) = b, and V ′ = V ∪{x}.
By Proposition 8, we have that




























































Hence, we have that r1 + r2 = s1 + s2 and the result follows.
Appendix B - Proof of Proposition 11
Proposition The non-voters greedy algorithm is not optimal.



















Fig. 8 A network and an evaluation for which the non-voter greedy algorithm does not
yield an optimal bribing strategy. The numbers or the symbol ∗ above or left of each node,
indicate the initial evaluation of the corresponding customer.
Proof We present the following counter-example to the optimality of the non-
voter greedy algorithm. Consider a 6-clique X of non-voters, each connected
to an associated voter with evaluation 12 as is depicted in Figure 8.















Suppose that we bribe some clique customer x ∈ X its maximal amount of 1.
By Proposition 9 the revenue gained is a monotonic formula in the amount

























Alternatively, suppose we bribe some non-clique customer x ∈ C \ X its max-

























2 , a greedy algorithm would first bribe a clique-customer the amount
1.
Consider now any unbribed non-voter and the pair it makes with the unique
voter it is adjacent to, as is depicted in Figure 8 by the vertices coloured
in gray. As long as the non-voter remains unbribed, we can bribe the voter
by 12 and gain an increase in revenue. Consequently, the non-voter greedy
algorithm will bribe at least one customer of each pair of non-voter in the
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clique and corresponding voter. Since there are five remaining such pairs, the
least amount that the greedy algorithm bribes, from the first step on, is 12 per
pair. To see this, observe that all cutomers evaluations are above 0.5, hence any
profitable bribe to a non-voter must also be above 0.5. Therefore, the revenue
produced by the strategy computed by the greedy algorithm is bounded by:







This is due to the fact that the maximum utility of the network after executing
any strategy σ is 12 = |C|, the initial utility of the network is 6, the amount
1 is spent on the first bribe, and at least 12 is spent on bribing the remaining
five voter/non-voter pairs, as established above. Consider now the strategy σ′
















P-rating(c, eval)− u0P − 3 = 12− 6− 3 = 3.
Appendix C - Proof of Theorem 1, left-to-right direction
We begin by showing two technical lemmas:
Lemma 2 Let σ be an optimal bribing strategy. Let X be the set of customers
for which eval(x) < evalσ(x) < 1. Let vy = |N(y) ∩ V | for any y ∈ C. For all










Proof We consider the effect of transferring δ > 0 of the bribe of x to the
bribe of y, where δ is as small as we like and where eval(x) < evalσ(x) −
δ < evalσ(x) + δ < 1 and eval(y) < evalσ(y) − δ < evalσ(y) + δ < 1. By






















Since we know that σ is an optimal bribing strategy, this change cannot yield a
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Now, we consider the effect of transferring δ amount of the bribe of y to the
































































In words, Lemma 2 shows that given an optimal bribing strategy, we can
move bribes amongst non-fully bribed voters arbitrarily without affecting the
revenue acquired so long as we do not totally remove all the bribe from a
customer that was not originally a non-voter, and we do not turn a non-voter
into a voting one.
Lemma 3 Let (C,E) be some network with initial evaluation eval0 and let
σ be a bribing strategy. Let c ∈ C be such that eval0(c) 6= ∗ and evalσ(c) =
δ > 0, but where for every customer c′′ ∈
⋃
{N(c′) : c′ ∈ N(c)}, we have that
δ < evalσ(c′′). If σ−c is the bribing strategy obtained from σ by removing the
bribe from c, we have that r(σ−c) ≥ r(σ).





For all z ∈ N2(x), we know that eval(z) > δ. In order to examine the change
in utility after setting eval(x) = ∗, we should consider the P-ratings of the
neighbours of x. Let y be a neighbour of x. The average P-rating of its voting
neighbours is clearly higher when eval(x) = ∗, since the previous evaluation of
x (δ) is lower than the evaluation of all of its other neighbours. Therefore, all
P-ratings of all neighbours of x increase; that is, the utility also increases.
We are now ready to detail the second part of the proof ( ⇐= ) of the
following statement:
Theorem BRIBE-NVKL is NP-complete.
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Proof ( ⇐= ) Suppose that ((C,E), eval0, ρ) is a yes-instance of NVKL and
that σ is a bribing strategy that yields a revenue of at least ρ. We will assume
that σ is also optimal, i.e., that there is no other strategy σ′ yielding a higher
revenue. We make this assumption so that we are able to apply Lemma 2,
which gives an important property of optimal bribing strategies that we will
repeatedly exploit throughout the remainder of this reduction.
We will now show that σ can be transformed into a revenue-equivalent
strategy such that (a) only old customers are bribed, (b) all bribed old cus-
tomers are bribed fully, and (c) exactly k old customers are bribed. Recall
the terminology from the reduction detailed in the proof of the right-to-left
direction of the theorem.
Revenue equivalent strategy - new customers Let us call new customers, the set
of edge and pendant customers. We begin by showing that σ can be modified
into an optimal strategy that does not bribe any new customer.
Recall that the initial evaluation of any new customer is ε > 0. If a new
customer is bribed then the bribes to new customers can be enumerated in
descending order as 1− ε, 1− ε, ..., 1− ε, ε1, ε2, ..., εs, for some s ≥ 0 and where
0 < εi < 1− ε for each i = 1, 2, ..., s. Note that it is possible there is no bribe
of 1 − ε; that is, that no new customer is fully bribed. We may assume that
s ≤ 1, since if s ≥ 2 then by Lemma 2, we could reduce the bribes ε2, ε3, ..., εs
without making any equal to zero, so as to increase the bribe ε1 to 1− ε and
secure another fully bribed new customer.
We begin by proving that there exists an old customer c′ who has not been
bribed and where at most one of its adjacent new pendant customers has been
bribed. Our initial choice of ε was such that
ε =
k
n+ n2 + 3n2
.
Furthermore, the amount invested k, is certainly less than n. Therefore we
have that
ε ≤ n




, and 1− ε > 2n+ 3
2n+ 5
.
Let p be the number of old customers that have been fully bribed and let t be
the number of new customers that have been bribed. By summing the total
amount bribed, we have that p+ 1 + t(1− ε) < k. Thus
t <
k − p− 1
1− ε
<
(2n+ 5)(n− p− 1)
2n+ 3
,
and therefore t < 2(n − (p + 1)). This says that the number of bribed new
customers is strictly less than twice the number of old customers that remain
unbribed. If every unbribed old customer was adjacent to two or more bribed
new pendant customers then we would have that t ≥ 2(n − (p + 1)) which is
clearly not possible. Therefore we can conclude that there exists an unbribed
old customer c′ such that at most one of its adjacent new pendant vertices has
been bribed.
40 Grandi, Stewart, and Turrini
We now consider two cases. Case 1a: we suppose that there exists a fully
bribed new customer, and derive a contradiction with the optimality of σ.
Consider the bribe of 1− ε to c, and consider the increase in P-rating gener-
ated by this single bribe. If c is a new pendant customer then this contribution
is certainly less than 2 as |N(c)| = 2, and if c is a new edge customer then this
contribution is less than 3 as |N(c)| = 3. Therefore, in all cases, the bribe of
1− ε to c contributes less than 3 units to the overall utility accrued from σ.
Let c′ be an old customer that is not bribed and that is adjacent to at
most one new pendant customer that has been bribed (such customer exists,
as shown above). Consider moving the 1− ε bribe from c to c′; so, we obtain a
new (efficient) strategy σ′. Let us examine the increase in P-rating generated
by this new 1− ε bribe.
At least n− 1 of the new pendant customers adjacent to c′ have not been
bribed and so the associated cumulative increase in rating is given by (n −
1) 12 − (n− 1)ε. Given that ε ≤
2











Bribing c′ might reduce the P -ratings of c′ and its adjacent new edge cus-
tomers. However, this reduction is certainly less than 4 units. Therefore we
may conclude that the movement of 1 − ε of bribe from c to c′ increases the





− 7 units. This amount is
strictly positive for n sufficiently large (n ≥ 14). Therefore the strategy σ′ that
we have constructed yields a revenue greater than that of σ, in contradiction
with its optimality.
Case 2a: we suppose that some new customer c has been bribed some
amount δ such that 0 < δ < 1− ε, and by a detailed case study (omitted) we
derive a contradiction with the optimality of σ.
We can now conclude that no new customer have been bribed in the revenue-
equivalent optimal strategy σ.
Revenue equivalent strategy - old customers We now turn our attention to
old customers. The bribes on old customers can be enumerated in descending
order as 1, 1, ..., 1, δ1, δ2, ..., δm, for some m ≥ 0 and where 0 < δi < 1, for
each i = 1, 2, ...,m, with possibly no bribes of 1. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that
∑m
i=1 δi ≤ 1; otherwise, we would have that m ≥ 2 and
we could reduce the bribes δ2, δ3, ..., δm, without making any equal to zero, so
as to increase the bribe δ1 to 1 and secure another fully bribed customer.
Observe that by Lemma 3, we can assume that at most one old customer
has not been fully bribed. We now reason by cases.
Case 1b: suppose now that there is in fact one bribed old customer that
has not been fully bribed. Let us call this old customer c and further suppose
that it has been bribed δ where 0 < δ < 1. We will again show that this yields
yet another contradiction with the optimality of σ. We have the capacity to
increase this bribe to 1 at a cost of 1−δ (which we can do, given the remaining
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resource). The P-rating of all the customers within N(c) will increase with










Hence we obtain an increase in revenue for n sufficiently large (n ≥ 3). This
contradicts the optimality of σ. Henceforth, we assume that, without loss of
generality, any optimal bribing strategy σ on (C,E), with initial evaluation
eval0, is necessarily such that only old customers are bribed and bribed old
customers are fully bribed.
Case 2b: suppose now that the bribing strategy σ bribes less than k old
customers; so, there is an old customer c that has not been bribed. Let us
amend σ to obtain a new bribing strategy σ′ by bribing c so that σ(c) = 1.
This costs us 1 unit of resource. There is no customer of C such that its
P-rating decreases, and the cumulative increase in P-rating of the n new


















which is strictly greater than 1 (the amount invested) for n sufficiently large
(n ≥ 5). This contradicts the optimality of σ. Furthermore, it is clear that
more than k old customers could not have been bribed since the initial utility
of the network totals only k and each old customer is bribed by 1.
Finding an independent set of size k We have shown above that the optimal
bribing strategy σ on (C,E) is such that only old customers are bribed, all
bribed old customers are fully bribed, and exactly k old customers are bribed.
Consider now the revenue accruing from our optimal bribing strategy σ. Irre-
spective of which k old customers are fully-bribed, the increase in P-rating
due to these old customers is equal to:
(1 + (n+ 3)ε)
n+ 4
− ε = 1− ε
n+ 4
,
and the P-rating of the pendant customers adjacent to each of these bribed
old customers increases by:
1 + ε
2
− ε = 1− ε
2
.
All that remains is to compute the revenue accruing due to the new edge
customers adjacent to each of these bribed old customers (as the P-rating of
any other old or new customer does not change). However, this depends upon
how many bribed old customers each new edge customer is adjacent to. Let mi
denote the number of new edge customers adjacent to i bribed old customers,
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for i = 1, 2. If a new edge customer c is adjacent to 1 bribed old customer then
its increase in P-rating is
(1 + ε)
2
− ε = (1− ε)
2




− ε = 2(1− ε)
3
.








We also know that by counting the edges joining bribed old customers and
their adjacent new edge customers, we obtain that 3k = 2m2 +m1. Hence, the












































Clearly this revenue is largest when m2 is 0, and if m2 > 0 then the revenue is
less than this maximal value. Also, when m2 is 0 this revenue is exactly equal
to ρ. Hence, as we started with a yes-instance of NVKL, we must have that
m2 = 0, i.e., that no edge customer is adjacent to two bribed old customers.
Thus, the k vertices of G corresponding to the k bribed old customers in C
form an independent set, and (G, k) is a yes-instance of ISREG(3).
